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Fifth article of this project Research for this project was supported by the Graduate Startup Interns Program and the Virtual Immersions and Experiential Work Program (both at Georgetown University).

China has a record and vested interest in engaging in activities designed to increase international economic development. This is particularly well documented in the tech sector, as the previous articles in our series clearly highlight. Perhaps nowhere is more vulnerable and targeted as the Sub-Saharan African countries which continue to pursue sustainable economic and social growth. Given the scope of these series on the dynamics affecting Portuguese-speaking countries, the case studies of the largest Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) African states (Angola and Mozambique) are important to consider when assessing Beijing’s information communication technologies for development (ICT4D) direction.

China begins this process in the advanced ICT and artificial intelligence (AI) age with a foundational policy direction that it looks to emulate for increased collaboration with and profit from these specific African states. Here, this article will outline the nature of the “Angola Model” previously pursued by Beijing as it is applied to the tech sector and its implementation in statewide economies. This is essential to understand due to the attractive potential of resource-rich nations like Angola and Mozambique that are not outliers in the broader modern African experience. From this history and continued pull towards market penetration in the region, China will likely remain an interested partner and influence in states like Angola, Mozambique, and beyond in the developing world, making its directions in ICT and AI spread in these countries a critical component of an overall development and diplomatic strategy.

Geopolitical Foundations

China and Angola are well-suited to collaborate in tech policy due to conditions that supersede transitory disagreements which may dampen relations between Luanda and Beijing at times [1]. Among the strongest forces pushing the two states together are their complementary political economy structures. Both economies are predominantly state-driven and can quickly implement business and development policy. As such, Chinese State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) have worked so collaboratively with Angolan political and military institutions. This relationship is further supported by guanxi and the use of military officials as “local patrons” supporting Chinese projects [2].

This pattern is commonly viewed as the “Angola Model,” which China seeks to emulate elsewhere. Angola’s prominent coastline bordering the South Atlantic is attractive to powers like China because according to Vogt (2017), “behind only Brazil, Angola is by far the most lucrative former Portuguese colonial possession” due to boasting a coastline ideally positioned to take advantage of natural resources wealth. The distinction is reflective of a dreaded “resource curse” that cripples socioeconomic development. Amidst this bedrock of instability, wealthy and well-connected Angolans have moved their position to perceived safe havens, including Portuguese economic and media institutions.[3; 4]

Modern Development Patterns and Initiatives

Chinese entities have invested significantly in Angola, including in ICT capital investment targets in “electronic equipment.” [5] This appears to confirm current alignment between China and Angola in public “pledges” to “grow ICT ties” [6] in areas such as Angolan agriculture, where international aid attempts sustainable growth by leveraging ICT [7]. Digital aid to Angola includes platforms, apps, and connectivity infrastructure to inform growers with critical information about weather, cultivation practices, buyers, markets, funding, and real-time payments in location-specific situations [8]. Funding also appears in loans from China supporting broadband connectivity since 2023 [9]and a January 2025 commitment of about USD 33 million from PRC champion ICT corporation ZTE [10].

China has been an active partner in establishing network connectivity across Angola via fiber-optic cable projects [11] and a MOU with Huawei [12]. Broadband expansion funded by the China Exim Bank and a bespoke loan of USD 249 million [13] comes alongside a plan to build cell towers to upgrade Angolan networks to 4G [14]. These investments from the China Exim Bank are so valued that the bank willingly negotiates in suspending some significant debt charged to Angola [15]. PRC entities have sought to maintain control and integration over ICT products, data security, research partnerships, and innovation standards [16]. Experts like Stephanie Arnold believe that China’s digital “Angola Model” shows a priority towards “Africa’s digital development” to solidify “Chinese structural power in the ICT sector.” [17] Angola has capacity to encourage this flourishing relationship, as 2022 World Bank data indicates more than half of Angolans have no reliable electricity, a foundational element for consistent ICT access [18].

Public Opinion Management

Beijing faces a challenge from the Angolan people that creates a difficult political dilemma for Luanda given that PRC investment has not led to significant domestic job growth; this is consistent with China’s development projects worldwide [19; 20]. Luanda is thus frustrated that there is little potential for skills transfer that can keep the country abreast of current trends/capabilities without Chinese support, creating a dependency due to higher cost of non-Chinese ICTs [21]. Here, Jessie Yin finds that “the earlier years of China-Angola relations were plagued with issues related to project completion, safety regulations, environmental protections, and a large volume of imported Chinese labor at the exclusion of local laborers.” [22] The scale of the problem appears to concern Beijing, as evidenced by enhancements to technical education and new training centers [23]. PRC commitment to international development overall makes it especially likely that such projects will continue as part of Beijing’s diplomatic strategy supported through interactions like Angola’s telecom minister visiting Huawei in 2024 [24]. Angola thereby faces the potential for ICT dependence on China in the visible future, a reality threatening physical and digital sovereignty [25]. Resisting this impending dependence is further complicated because Beijing previously alleviated some suffering in the immediate and crippling aftermath of civil war [26].

Surveillance Interests

Surveillance strategies in Angola are generally intended to address specific issues driving political protest and collective action in the following areas [27]:

1. Conversations expressing dissatisfaction with the Luanda regime, such as comparisons and mentions of the “Arab Spring;”
2. Angolan purchases of Portuguese companies that were operating in Angola after the 2008 global financial crisis;
3. Funds from Angola credited to Portugal to finance its former debt;
4. The competition for contract bids in Angola between China and Europe (Portugal).

Luanda may have a solution to maintain bilateral relations and preserve the appearance of popular legitimacy in this environment. The objective is achievable through implementing widespread surveillance technologies, as supported via Chinese loans in the 2020s targeting security, enforcement, and other best practices [28]. Angola has a history of repression due to prior surveillance campaigns driven by individuals like Fernando Garcia Miala, a former official and Deputy Interior Minister who helped secure close ties with Beijing. An emphasis on “electronic surveillance” was implemented in legal provisions from the 2010s governing data access and signals intelligence. These legal codes also legitimized investigative uses of surveillance ICTs “even in crimes that have not yet been committed but are imminent.” This is consistent with more recent government action controlling and recording mobile phone conversations to include “video surveillance.” [29]

Mozambique is an “Angola Model” target for Beijing, as seen in PRC persistence to secure natural resource access guarantees [30]. Beijing may also be aware of other international development donors whose prior efforts were designed to bolster “the policy environment” for speedy “economic development.” [31] PRC leaders openly tout Mozambique’s “loyalty” to China as a pretext for continuing aid and advancing a diplomatic relationship “through think and thin.” [32] Even so, traditional PRC FDI tactics do not work well in Mozambique due to challenges in geography, infrastructure, and utilities deployment that incur increased costs for aid donors [33]. Perhaps in response, Chinese lenders have cancelled some of Mozambique’s debt and recognize a sunk cost as a result [34].

Mozambique has received support from Chinese entities such as the large Hubei Gaza Friendship Farm managed by the Wanbao Africa Agriculture Development, which provides agricultural technology to cultivate key crops [35; 36]. China was an early supporter in an “Agriculture Technology Demonstration Center” (ATDC), through the Hubei Lianfeng Agricultural Development Corporation [37] the Moamba Technology Park [38], and the Maluana Data Center [39]. PRC involvement comes in spite Mozambique’s relative natural isolation in FDI that has comes from just two substantial sources: China and Brazil. However, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have operated in Mozambique and through that channel the country has received ICT investments larger than many of its peer nations [40]. China is generally loathe to cooperating with NGOs, a policy that risks losing Maputo’s acceptance of Chinese ICT initiatives [41] in an atmosphere where Mozambique’s sovereignty may hang in the balance in the foreseeable future. These concerns are top of mind in Mozambique given that approximately 69% of Chinese investment has been concentrated in the capital (Maputo) [42].

ICT support ideally addresses the country’s biggest socioeconomic challenges, namely a deficiency in structural capital, human capital, financial capital, poor infrastructure, and misguided expectation setting from investment partners that poisons public opinion [43]. David Robinson expresses hope in recent years that investment could lead to a “green revolution” of leapfrogging where ICT could power agricultural output with meaningful comparative advantage in global trade [44]. Chinese loans attempted to accomplish this by financing mobile “modernization and expansion” [45] to build “social infrastructure” and grow the network reach of small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), national institutions, technology education/training.

In Mozambique, the national “experience illustrates the tension between long-term development goals like local…transfer of skills and technology…and short-term measures to address infrastructural needs.” [46] To achieve the “competitive pricing, high speed, and efficiency” required to start, complete, and reap the benefits of new ICT development in Mozambique, the country must consider “the competitive advantages of Chinese firms” in ICT infrastructure construction [47]. Chinese dominance also extends to education given Mozambique’s embrace of Confucius Institute expansion [48], technical training to combat malaria [49], and project training to help Mozambique connect to satellite television broadcasts [50]. These initiatives are challenged by the pre-existing diversity of languages native to the country [51]. PRC interests consequently appear interested in expanding Portuguese language proficiency to address this economic limitation since Portuguese offers better economies of scale for tailoring favorable messaging and trade policy impressions towards Beijing [52; 53].

Overall Chinese Impacts

The overlapping factors above translate into three principal outcomes in Sino-Mozambican relations:

1. A sustained focus on China-related issues even in a Mozambican media environment that leans anti-China [54]. China may be able to shift the narrative through Huawei’s entry into connectivity and e-government projects [55] alongside the growing availability of StarTimes satellite television [56; 57] that could spread “patriotic (pro-CCP) journalism.” [58]
2. A transition to digital broadcasting capabilities as a primary goal of public works and ICT infrastructure development efforts in Mozambique. [59; 60]
3. A unified control over supply chains and labor to address technical training gaps in the local population. One particularly impactful practice is “land grabbing” for projects beneficial to Chinese interests [61] that creates a “perceived Chinese tendency to establish enclaves, which are often difficult for even Mozambican government officials to access.” [62]
4. An opening of trade potential in the economically promising Zambezi Valley with greater development of agribusiness and energy sectors there. [63]

Given the possibilities, China is still stressed by constraints like the high cost for foreign firms to expand in new markets. Competition for the Mozambican ICT sector is intense due to the presence of Ericsson, a Huawei competitor. [64] That said, Huawei has some competitive advantage due to Ericsson’s most recent corruption scandal [65; 66; 67]. With this reputational boost, Huawei continues to receive praise from Mozambique for its growing investments that acknowledges a productive history of cooperation between the two countries [68].

Mozambique hopes to build on this foundation through “assertive” policies promoting “the installation of Chinese industries,” with “the (resulting) technology transfer (as) the expectation of the future.” [69] Yet for now joint Sino-Mozambican ventures to create ICT connectivity beyond Maputo still face serious resource issues to reach nationwide 4G and 5G capability [70]. This makes decisions like Huawei’s plan to set up a 5G rail communications system [71] all the more encouraging for Maputo to believe that Beijing is committed to Mozambique for the long term.

Maputo thus appears particularly excited for Beijing’s ICT development support in surveillance capabilities. Ernesto Nhanale notes that the “authoritarian commonalities” between Mozambique and China promote enthusiastic collaboration from ZTE and Huawei, providers well-versed with crafting effective and affordable monitoring systems [72]. The assistance also dovetails well with a previous MOU for judicial cooperation between the two countries that may be applicable with the use of relevant ICTs in enforcement data collection [73]. Concerns about security are magnified in the midst of a notable rise in terrorist activity northern Mozambique, far from Maputo [74].

In addressing the threat, Maputo may use surveillance deployment that includes financial transaction and social media platforms, both of which dovetail Mozambique’s telecom and digital financial infrastructure goals. Mozambique’s continued economic development thus may be dictated by Maputo’s interest in the ability to perform advanced technological tasks in surveillance practices ranging from message interception, social network tracking, and up-to-date offensive/defensive cyber tools [75].

China’s aforementioned reputation as an active participant in continuous innovation in surveillance technology appears to strongly underscore its approach towards its market penetration and diplomatic influence in multiple international states. The cases of Angola and Mozambique in this area are thus highly educational for policy analysts and practitioners as they may observe Chinese activities in emerging market regions like Sub-Saharan Africa. This, may be powerfully merged with China’s logical and probable interest in replicating and spreading its “Angola Model” strategy to best leverage the power of its ICT and AI innovations, platforms, and products.

From such a takeaway, the case studies of Angola, Mozambique, and their tech-related relations with China raises an important question to address in the short to medium term. Here, the emphasis on surveillance technology financing especially denotes a potential for developing countries to be put on a path towards a potentially inevitable ossification of digital authoritarianism. This puts expertise in the dynamics of dictators and related elites in continents like Africa to be put a greater premium. Such a path is crucially supported in a popular sense by a concurrent emphasis on agricultural improvements in target societies, a condition that could especially mollify citizen concerns about the aggregation of power at the top of national political structures. As such, these approaches in sum represent a new way to envision development efforts in key emerging markets and developing countries, a reality that deserves greater analytical scrutiny as the influence of China continues to pass around the world.

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